Take a leaf out of Chanakya's foreign policy book
Foreign policy is much more than what ambassadors, mistakenly thought to be imbibing champagne from noon onwards, are engaged in. It provides the framework, values, and principles that govern the conduct of foreign relations of a country with the rest of the world. The 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy and the decision on permitting foreign direct investment in retail are part of foreign policy.
Let us compare India's approach to globalisation with, say, South Korea's. When it decided to open up its economy, South Korea made three lists. List 1 was that of industries where the country had a decisive competitive advantage globally. List 2 was of industries where it had a clear competitive disadvantage. List 3 was of industries in between and it was assessed that the country might establish competitive advantage in the case of some of them after 'x' years. Industries in Lists 1 and 2 were opened up. Those in List 3 were given 'x' years to shape up.
India's trade with China follows a colonial pattern. India exports iron ore and imports finished products. The two-way trade amounts to $60 billion with a $20 billion deficit for India. It is a mistaken belief that the more trade between India and China the better will be the political relations between the two. Do not forget that France and Germany had a high level of trade in 1914. Globalisation needs correction.
India has tended to be textual rather than contextual by attaching more importance to the word — written or spoken — rather than assessing the capabilities, intentions, and track record of the interlocutor. Take the case of the non-battle of Plassey in 1757. Siraj ud-Daula had 50,000 troops against Robert Clive's 3,000. Siraj had divided his troops into four units, each under a general. He knew three generals were disloyal to him. Instead of sacking and imprisoning them, he asked them to swear allegiance to him in public. They did and then betrayed him. The same tendency to take words seriously was exhibited in Shimla in 1972. Indira Gandhi was outwitted by Z A Bhutto, the most accomplished thespian in politics in his time.
Yet another tendency of Indian diplomats is to take upon themselves the responsibility to 'save' a summit meeting. In the 1965 Tashkent Agreement, India gave in unnecessarily. In diplomacy one should not be irrationally allergic to failure.
The 1987 military intervention in Sri Lanka was ill-considered. There was no good reason to believe that President Jayawardhene was able or willing to deliver what he signed into with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Since Prabhakaran was opposed to the terms of the agreement there was no reason to believe that India could militarily annihilate the LTTE and thereafter engender a peaceful political process. Once again the approach was textual and not contextual.
India has neglected Chanakya. It is not enough to have a Chanakyapuri. Arthasastra is relevant to our times. India should have been proud of him and should have erected a statue of his in the Foreign Service Institute in the capital. Chanakya assessed that at least one neighbour of a country will be a 'natural enemy.' It is abundantly clear that Pakistan and China, going by their track record, have treated India as their 'natural enemy.' India has to take note of this fact. It will be foolish to believe that it is possible to charm Pakistan and change its behavior. It does not make sense to characterise Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani as a man of peace. If he is not in charge of Pakistan, his 'peaceful intentions' are of no worth. If he is in charge, his 'peaceful intentions' include the attack on India's embassy in Kabul and a firm determination to prevent the punishment of 26/11's perpetrators.
The world is changing significantly. We should look at the big picture. The US is declining, though it will remain number one for the foreseeable future. The European Union is in a bad shape. China is rising and its rise might be peaceful or otherwise. The alliance between China and Pakistan will remain firm. It will be in India's interest that the US has a large military presence in East Asia so that China is kept in check and prevented from causing trouble at the border. A permanent seat on the Security Council is India's right. But, there is no point in chasing it the way India has been doing.
National interest is primarily the interests of the nationals. India should not remain for long a superpower in poverty. Foreign policy's aims include the ability to protect territorial integrity, clout to successfully persuade others to agree to one's point of view in matters of national interest, war on poverty on a war-footing, preserving peace, and promoting justice globally.
Foreign policy is much more than what ambassadors, mistakenly thought to be imbibing champagne from noon onwards, are engaged in. It provides the framework, values, and principles that govern the conduct of foreign relations of a country with the rest of the world. The 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy and the decision on permitting foreign direct investment in retail are part of foreign policy.
Let us compare India's approach to globalisation with, say, South Korea's. When it decided to open up its economy, South Korea made three lists. List 1 was that of industries where the country had a decisive competitive advantage globally. List 2 was of industries where it had a clear competitive disadvantage. List 3 was of industries in between and it was assessed that the country might establish competitive advantage in the case of some of them after 'x' years. Industries in Lists 1 and 2 were opened up. Those in List 3 were given 'x' years to shape up.
India's trade with China follows a colonial pattern. India exports iron ore and imports finished products. The two-way trade amounts to $60 billion with a $20 billion deficit for India. It is a mistaken belief that the more trade between India and China the better will be the political relations between the two. Do not forget that France and Germany had a high level of trade in 1914. Globalisation needs correction.
India has tended to be textual rather than contextual by attaching more importance to the word — written or spoken — rather than assessing the capabilities, intentions, and track record of the interlocutor. Take the case of the non-battle of Plassey in 1757. Siraj ud-Daula had 50,000 troops against Robert Clive's 3,000. Siraj had divided his troops into four units, each under a general. He knew three generals were disloyal to him. Instead of sacking and imprisoning them, he asked them to swear allegiance to him in public. They did and then betrayed him. The same tendency to take words seriously was exhibited in Shimla in 1972. Indira Gandhi was outwitted by Z A Bhutto, the most accomplished thespian in politics in his time.
Yet another tendency of Indian diplomats is to take upon themselves the responsibility to 'save' a summit meeting. In the 1965 Tashkent Agreement, India gave in unnecessarily. In diplomacy one should not be irrationally allergic to failure.
The 1987 military intervention in Sri Lanka was ill-considered. There was no good reason to believe that President Jayawardhene was able or willing to deliver what he signed into with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Since Prabhakaran was opposed to the terms of the agreement there was no reason to believe that India could militarily annihilate the LTTE and thereafter engender a peaceful political process. Once again the approach was textual and not contextual.
India has neglected Chanakya. It is not enough to have a Chanakyapuri. Arthasastra is relevant to our times. India should have been proud of him and should have erected a statue of his in the Foreign Service Institute in the capital. Chanakya assessed that at least one neighbour of a country will be a 'natural enemy.' It is abundantly clear that Pakistan and China, going by their track record, have treated India as their 'natural enemy.' India has to take note of this fact. It will be foolish to believe that it is possible to charm Pakistan and change its behavior. It does not make sense to characterise Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani as a man of peace. If he is not in charge of Pakistan, his 'peaceful intentions' are of no worth. If he is in charge, his 'peaceful intentions' include the attack on India's embassy in Kabul and a firm determination to prevent the punishment of 26/11's perpetrators.
The world is changing significantly. We should look at the big picture. The US is declining, though it will remain number one for the foreseeable future. The European Union is in a bad shape. China is rising and its rise might be peaceful or otherwise. The alliance between China and Pakistan will remain firm. It will be in India's interest that the US has a large military presence in East Asia so that China is kept in check and prevented from causing trouble at the border. A permanent seat on the Security Council is India's right. But, there is no point in chasing it the way India has been doing.
National interest is primarily the interests of the nationals. India should not remain for long a superpower in poverty. Foreign policy's aims include the ability to protect territorial integrity, clout to successfully persuade others to agree to one's point of view in matters of national interest, war on poverty on a war-footing, preserving peace, and promoting justice globally.
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